Jurisdiction of Control in the Hosting Certification Framework Strategic Tier

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Executive summary

Where a provider is incorporated does not settle who can compel it: residency is not jurisdiction. A company registered in Australia may be controlled from abroad, and control, not incorporation, is what a foreign jurisdiction can act through. The Hosting Certification Framework certifies providers at Strategic tier, its highest, without resolving that question. This assessment resolves it.

The subject is the framework's Strategic-tier certified-provider list, **28 providers holding 32 certifications**, captured and archived on 21 July 2026. Each provider is resolved, on primary ownership records, to a legal entity, a jurisdiction of incorporation, and a jurisdiction of control.

Ten of the twenty-eight providers are under foreign control: eight United States, one Japan, one Canada. The jurisdiction finding is confirmed for all ten. For two of them the framework certifies a product rather than a named entity, and the exact certificate-holding company is inferred rather than confirmed; for a third the register entry is brand-only and the specific certified company is not pinned. In all three cases every candidate rolls up to the same foreign parent, so the entity caveats do not disturb the jurisdiction finding.

Two further providers, Canberra Data Centres and DigiCo, resolve to a named Australian top company above which control passes into a consortium of fund and custodial holdings, or a stapled listed trust, that a register of companies does not record. For Canberra Data Centres the register records, on its face, a New Zealand company beneficially holding 49.7 per cent of the ordinary class, the largest single holding, and a foreign registered custodian company holding a further 34.5 per cent non-beneficially for a beneficiary it does not name; class voting weightings are not stated, so no control percentage can be computed from the register. DigiCo carries no comparable figure because its holdings are unitised in a stapled listed trust the companies register does not itemise; that is the same finding in a stronger form, in that for Canberra Data Centres the register shows a foreign parcel and still cannot resolve control, while for DigiCo it cannot show the parcel at all. This is a named structural uncertainty at a specific point in the chain. It is not an assertion of hidden foreign ownership, and the assessment does not claim to know who sits behind that layer.

A second finding, of a different kind, concerns the register itself. **The framework certifies names, and nothing in it tests whether a certified name still corresponds to a live legal person.** "Sliced Tech Pty Ltd" was listed at Strategic tier on 21 July 2026, though ASIC had recorded that company as deregistered on 10 June 2026; "Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd" is a former company name. A peer Commonwealth register, the Australian Business Register, reflected the deregistration within six days; the framework had not reflected it after six weeks.

The Australian findings are the control on the foreign ones. The same method that found ten foreign providers confirmed fifteen Australian, applied identically in both directions: eight Australian chains that read Australian by rule were opened, at additional cost, to test that reading, and all eight terminated at natural persons rather than at companies, funds or trusts, at Australian registered addresses but for one foreign-address minority holding, disclosed in Section 6.

This is not a compellability assessment (that is its companion, AOS-CMP-2026-001), nor a ranking of providers, nor procurement advice. It establishes jurisdiction of control, not full beneficial ownership.

10 foreign + 2 `beneficial_unresolved` + 15 Australian-control + 1 register-flag = 28 providers.

Section 1: What was assessed, and what was not

This assessment establishes one thing: the **jurisdiction of control** of every provider certified at Strategic tier under the Hosting Certification Framework, as at the certified-provider list captured and archived on 21 July 2026 [H-HCF-1].

AustraliaOS is an independent jurisdictional-exposure assessment practice. This assessment is built entirely on primary public records, and it was commissioned by no party to its findings.

What was assessed. The framework's Strategic-tier certified-provider list, **28 providers holding 32 certifications**, resolved, for each provider, to a legal entity, a jurisdiction of incorporation, and a jurisdiction of control, with every fact traced to a primary record that was retrieved, archived, and hashed (Section 2).

As at when. The findings speak to the state of the register on 21 July 2026, and to the ownership facts recorded in the primary sources retrieved across the capture window of 21 to 22 July 2026 (the manifest carries every retrieval time). One source is inherited: the AWS Australia Pty Ltd extract [H-AWS-1] was retrieved on 18 July 2026 under AOS-CBA-2026-001 and re-verified against its recorded hash on 21 July 2026. Retrieval and re-verification are distinct acts, and the manifest records both dates. Sixteen further captures post-date the window and are not ownership records: the Sliced Tech business-name and unit-trust records and the framework homepage, retrieved 25 July 2026, in support of Section 3; five register-name searches, a company summary and a company extract, retrieved 28 July 2026, in support of the notification record; the statutory text of 18 USC 2705, retrieved 30 July 2026, in support of the Section 7 non-observability limit; and the practice's own outbound correspondence — four notices and one letter to the framework's reform team, sent 21, 25 and 28 July 2026 — held as five .eml exports made 2 August 2026, whose manifest dates are the export dates, not the send dates, in support of the notification record; the manifest dates each. The register capture carries the Department's reform notice: the Hosting Certification Framework is undergoing reform, with certification registration of prospective providers, and of certified providers seeking supplementary assessment, paused from 3 November 2025 until the reforms are completed, and certified providers stated as not impacted [H-HCF-1]. The findings therefore speak to the register as it stood during that pause; no conclusion is drawn here about the reform's content or outcome. The certified-provider list is a live government page and may change after its capture date; where a listing is later corrected, the finding becomes a record of the state that existed at capture. The 21 July list capture was first read into working notes and archived as a hashed page the same calendar day [H-HCF-1]; the archived record carries its actual capture time and nothing is backdated.

The distinction the method serves: residency is not jurisdiction. Where a provider is incorporated does not settle who can compel it. A company registered in Australia may be controlled from abroad, and control is what bears on compellability. The whole method (the definition of `ultimate_parent` as the beneficial owner rather than the ASIC ultimate-holding-company field, and the stopping rule that traces control in either direction) exists to separate the jurisdiction of control from the jurisdiction of incorporation. This is the premise stated once, plainly, at the top.

Out of scope, by design. These boundaries are deliberate and are distinct from the stated limits in Section 7. A stated limit is a point at which a finding of this assessment could not be completed; a boundary here is a question this assessment did not set out to answer. The assessment does **not** test foreign compellability itself; that is the subject of AOS-CMP-2026-001, and Section 8 sets out the relationship. It does **not** rank or score providers, and does **not** advise on procurement. And it does **not** name the natural persons behind every Australian chain beyond the point at which jurisdiction of control is settled; tracing further would be a beneficial-ownership exercise the assessment expressly does not undertake (Section 2). A reader should not read any of these design boundaries as a gap; the gaps are the eleven items in Section 7, and they are labelled as such.

Section 2: Method

The assessment establishes, for each provider, the **jurisdiction of control** of the legal entity the Hosting Certification Framework certifies. Its central methodological move is a definition: `ultimate_parent` is the **ultimate beneficial owner or controller**, and it is deliberately **not** the "ultimate holding company" field recorded by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The Corporations Act concept of an ultimate holding company stops at the top *company* in a chain; it does not record a fund, a trust, or a limited partnership sitting above that company. An entity can therefore declare an Australian ultimate holding company to ASIC while control rests with capital held in a structure the companies register does not record. Compellability, the capacity of a foreign jurisdiction to compel a provider, attaches to control, not to the last company in a chain. Where the assessment records the ASIC ultimate-holding-company field, it keeps it as its own datum, separate from the beneficial-owner finding, so that a divergence between the two is read as the point of the exercise rather than as an error.

2.1 Claims and the evidence standard

Every fact in the register traces to a primary record that was retrieved, archived, and hashed. The archive manifest records, for each source, a SHA-256 of the stored file and a `capture_type`. The `capture_type` takes one of three values and is an integrity feature, not a caveat. **`raw_body`**: the stored file is the actual HTTP response body (a curl retrieval or a downloaded document) or the served artefact itself, such as a purchased ASIC company extract or a filing drawn from SEC EDGAR. **`rendered_capture`**: a capture of the page as displayed, used where the raw body is not obtainable. **`transcription`**: a faithful reconstruction of content read from a rendered source whose raw body cannot be exported, such as an ASIC Connect search, which returns only a bot-check shell to an automated request. A transcription attests what was displayed, not what the server returned, and is labelled so that it is never read as a raw body. The distinction lets a reader weigh each fact by how directly its source was captured.

2.2 The five-token vocabulary

`ultimate_parent` carries exactly one of five tokens, never a bare null.

- **`resolved`**: a named terminus is established, with its jurisdiction, being a natural person, a foreign company, or an Australian holding company that settles the question. Example: AirTrunk Operating Pty Ltd, whose declared ultimate holding company is Blackstone Inc. (United States) [H-AIR-1].
- **`no_parent`**: the entity is the top of its own chain, with owners but no parent entity above it, as a widely-held or listed company does. Example: NEXTDC Limited, listed on the ASX.

- **`no_owner`**: established on primary sources that no ownership interest exists at all. Example: Deloitte, an Australian partnership whose international body, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, is a United Kingdom company limited by guarantee without share capital, and therefore has no shareholders [H-DEL-1, H-DEL-2, H-DEL-3].
- **`unresolved`**: a parent likely exists but the public record does not support resolving it, and nothing is established. This is the token for opaque private or fund ownership where the chain cannot be traced, the state Canberra Data Centres would have carried had its chain not, in fact, been traceable.
- **`beneficial_unresolved`**: the company chain *is* established to a named top company, but the beneficial layer above that company (a fund, trust, or stapled security) is not recorded by the companies register. Examples: Canberra Data Centres [H-CDC-1, H-CDC-2] and DigiCo [H-HDI-1, H-DGT-1].

`no_parent` and `no_owner` are separate tokens by design. A top company with many owners is a different fact from an entity with no owners at all: NEXTDC has thousands of owners and no parent; Deloitte has no owners. Collapsing the two would report “no parent above it” for both and conceal that one is widely owned and the other is unowned. Keeping them apart is the schema earning its keep: a reader sees which of the two is true without having to dig. `unresolved` and `beneficial_unresolved` are likewise distinct: the first records that nothing was established; the second records that the company structure is known and only the layer above it is dark.

2.3 The chain-traversal stopping rule

For each provider the company chain is traced upward, one hop at a time, and traversal stops and records the jurisdiction at the **first** of four conditions: (1) a fund, trust, or limited partnership, recorded as `beneficial_unresolved`; (2) a foreign operating company, recorded as `resolved` foreign; (3) a foreign holding company that is not an operating company, recorded as `resolved` foreign; or (4) a natural person at an Australian registered address, or an Australian holding company whose own ownership does not bear on the jurisdiction question, recorded as `resolved` Australia.

Condition 4 turns on the address the register prints, not on citizenship or residence, which a companies register does not record. Address is used as the jurisdictional proxy because reachability, not nationality, is what bears on compellability. Its limits are stated in Section 7.

The finding is the jurisdiction of control, not full beneficial ownership in the anti-money-laundering sense; the assessment does not trace to the natural persons behind every company. The rule stops as soon as jurisdiction is settled, and it stops in **either direction**: foreign at conditions 2 and 3, Australian at condition 4. That symmetry is the answer to the objection “why did you stop at an Australian holding company.” The rule stopped at a foreign holding company for the same reason and by the same test: once the jurisdiction of control is settled, a further hop adds cost without adding to the finding. The rule is applied identically in both directions, and the finding it produces is jurisdictional.

2.4 The depth policy

Where a chain stops at an Australian holding company under condition 4, the entity is recorded as **rule-terminated**: the jurisdiction reads Australia on the strength of the rule, and the ownership below that company is not itself opened. Where a chain is opened by primary extract all the way to a natural person, a foreign entity, or a fund, it is **extract-verified**. The two are never presented as the same evidentiary claim; the register states, on each entity's face, which it is. The policy is stated as a constraint and then exceeded: all eight of the condition-4 chains in this assessment were in fact opened to natural persons, so none remains rule-terminated. Where a chain terminates at a natural person, the assessment records the number of persons, the jurisdiction of their registered address, and their shareholdings, and does not print their names. The names are printed on the cited extract, which any reader can obtain; reproducing them here adds nothing to a finding that is jurisdictional.

2.5 Worked example: HDI SYD1 Pty Limited

The distinction this section draws, jurisdiction of control against the ASIC ultimate-holding-company field, is at its sharpest in one entity. HDI SYD1 Pty Limited, which operates DigiCo's Sydney enclave, records HMC Digital Infrastructure Ltd (ACN 682 024 924) as its ultimate holding company; that is an Australian company, and the field goes no further [H-HDI-1]. Read on its own, the field settles the jurisdiction question in a word: Australian.

The field is answering a narrower question than it appears to. HMC Digital Infrastructure Ltd is one half of the security that sits above the operating company: a share issued together with, and stapled to, a unit in HMC Digital Infrastructure Trust (ARSN 682 160 578), a registered managed investment scheme [H-DGT-1]. A register of companies has no line for a trust, so the layer where control is actually held is one the field cannot reach; what it returns as the top of the chain is only the last company before a structure it was never built to record. The result is the token `beneficial_unresolved`, condition 1: the chain is established to HMC Digital Infrastructure Ltd and stops at the trust above it, not because the record ran out but because the next layer is not a company.

This is why the assessment defines `ultimate_parent` as the beneficial owner and not the ASIC field, and why this entity, rather than Canberra Data Centres, leads the method: it is the same divergence reduced to its simplest form (one company and one trust, where CDC is a consortium of seven), so the whole principle is legible in a two-part structure sitting on the face of two archived records [H-HDI-1, H-DGT-1].

Section 3: Register-integrity findings

The Hosting Certification Framework certifies **names**. Its certified-provider list records each provider by a name and a set of facility or service codes. Nothing in the published list, and nothing in the framework's maintenance of it, tests whether a certified name still corresponds to a live legal person. The two findings below are instances of that gap on the list as captured and archived on 21 July 2026 [H-HCF-1]. They are stated as register observations. No conclusion about the conduct of the framework's administrator or of any provider is drawn; the registers are set beside one another and the reader draws the inference.

3.1 Finding A: Sliced Tech

The certified-provider list records, at Strategic tier, "Sliced Tech Pty Ltd – Government Cloud Service offering" [H-HCF-1]. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission records a company of that name, SLICED TECH PTY LTD, ACN 165 997 008, as deregistered, voluntarily, on 10 June 2026 [H-STK-4]. The deregistration is recorded as voluntary by the presence of a Form 6010, "Application For Voluntary Deregistration of a Company", on the company's record [H-STK-4]; the associated cancellation of its Australian Business Number, effective 16 June 2026, is recorded separately [H-STK-2].

The company of that name is the entity that contracted with the Commonwealth under that name. AusTender contract notice CN3836764-A7 (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Unique Student Identifier Website Cloud Hosting Services) records the supplier under ABN 53 165 997 008 [H-STK-1], and contract notice CN4180397 (Department of Defence) records the supplier under the same ABN 53 165 997 008 [H-STK-3]. That ABN is the Australian Business Number of ACN 165 997 008 [H-STK-2]. The two notices therefore pin the Commonwealth **contracting** entity under the name "Sliced Tech" to the company ASIC records as deregistered. They do not establish that the same company holds the HCF certificate: the certified-provider list entry is a name and a service code, and carries no ACN, ABN, or other legal-entity identifier [H-HCF-1]. The finding is that the list carries a name that resolves, on the Commonwealth's own contracting record, to a company of that name that ASIC records as deregistered.

The finding concerns the register, not the business. No inference is drawn that the provider is defunct, has ceased operating, or that any service has stopped. Voluntary deregistration of an operating company is routinely a restructure, and the surrounding public record is consistent with continuation: the business name "SLICED TECH" (ACT F00140871) remains registered [H-STK-6], and the "Sliced Tech Holdings Unit Trust" (ABN 66 290 396 526) remains active [H-STK-5]. Neither contract notice records a contract period extending beyond the deregistration date: CN3836764-A7 records a period ending 31 December 2025 [H-STK-1], and CN4180397 records a period ending 10 June 2026 [H-STK-3], the date of the deregistration.

The observation is limited to the correspondence between the certified name and the status of a company of that name on the companies register.

3.2 Finding B: Macquarie Telecom

The certified-provider list records, at Strategic tier, "Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd – IC4 and IC5" [H-HCF-1]. ASIC Connect records "Macquarie Telecom Pty Limited" as a **former** name of the company ACN 082 930 916 [H-MAQ-2], whose current registered name is Macquarie Technology Operations Pty Limited [H-MAQ-1]. The only other company on the register bearing the name "Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd", ACN 003 476 864, is deregistered. No live company carries "Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd" or "Macquarie Telecom Pty Limited" as its current registered name. The finding is that the certified-provider list carries a former company name.

The list separately records "Macquarie Technology – IC1, IC2, IC3 and IC3e" and "Macquarie Technology – Government Cloud Service offering" [H-HCF-1]. Because the current name of ACN 082 930 916 is Macquarie Technology Operations Pty Limited, it is a **strong inference, not established on the present record,** that the "Macquarie Telecom" entry and the "Macquarie Technology" entries certify a single legal entity under a former and a current name. Establishing that identity would require the framework's own record of which legal entity holds each certificate, which the published list does not provide.

3.3 The comparative control

The Australian Business Register cancelled ABN 53 165 997 008 with effect from 16 June 2026 [H-STK-2], six days after ASIC recorded the deregistration of ACN 165 997 008 on 10 June 2026. The Hosting Certification Framework certified-provider list still carried "Sliced Tech Pty Ltd" on 21 July 2026 [H-HCF-1], six weeks after the deregistration and five weeks after the ABN cancellation. One Commonwealth register reflected the change to the company's status within six days; the certification framework had not reflected it after six weeks.

3.4 Disclosure

AustraliaOS Pty Ltd notified the Digital Transformation Agency in writing on 21 July 2026 [H-NTC-1], and notified the Certifying Authority for the Hosting Certification Framework, the Department of Home Affairs, which has administered the framework since the machinery-of-government change of 1 May 2023 [H-HCF-3], in writing on 25 July 2026 [H-NTC-2]; the second notice disclosed the first. Each notice set out both observations above with their sources, and invited a correction of any factual error or a response to be carried in this publication.

AustraliaOS Pty Ltd notified the Digital Transformation Agency in writing on 21 July 2026 [H-NTC-1] and the Certifying Authority, the Department of Home Affairs, in writing on 25 July 2026 [H-NTC-2], the second notice disclosing the first. Each notice set out both Section 3 observations with their sources and invited a correction of any factual error or a response to be carried in this publication. Fourteen days were allowed in each case. No response had been received from either as at the date of publication, 4 August 2026.

The absence of a response is recorded as a fact, and no inference is drawn from it.

Section 4: The ownership register

At Strategic tier, the framework's highest, **10 of the 28 certified providers are under foreign control, 2 sit behind fund or trust structures the companies register cannot see through, and 15 resolve to natural persons at Australian addresses or to disclosed listed groups. The remaining provider is certified under a name that maps to a deregistered company; it is carried as a register-flag entry, not an ownership finding.** The rest of this section states each group and shows the entities and sources behind them.

4.1 The unit of count

The population is **28 providers holding 32 certifications**. Four providers hold two certifications each: Equinix (facility and enclave), Australian Data Centres (the Mitchell facility and the Fyshwick enclave), DigiCo (the BNE2 facility and the SYD1 enclave), and Macquarie Technology (an enclave and a cloud service), which is why 32 certifications reduce to 28 providers. The unit of count is the register entry, not the legal person. If the Section 3.2 inference holds and the "Macquarie Telecom" and "Macquarie Technology" entries certify one legal entity, the twenty-eight providers are twenty-seven distinct legal persons, and the four providers holding two certifications each become three holding two and one holding three; every count in this document is a count of register entries and is unchanged by that inference. Separately, the register lists **"Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd"** and **"Macquarie Technology"** as two entries whose names resolve toward **one legal entity, ACN 082 930 916** (Macquarie Telecom Pty Limited being a former name of Macquarie Technology Operations Pty Limited [H-MAQ-1, H-MAQ-2]). Every count in this section uses **providers** as the unit unless it states otherwise.

4.2 Foreign-controlled: 10 providers

Eight resolve to a United States parent, one to Japan, one to Canada. The jurisdiction is settled in every case; where the specific certificate-holding entity is inferred rather than confirmed, the row says so, and the jurisdiction finding stands regardless of that entity caveat because every candidate entity rolls up to the same foreign parent.

Provider	Entity (or head AU entity)	Declared ultimate parent	Jurisdiction	Ref
AirTrunk	AirTrunk Operating Pty Ltd (612 044 283)	Blackstone Inc.	United States	H-AIR-1
Amazon Web Services	Amazon Web Services Australia Pty Ltd (605 345 891)	Amazon.com, Inc.	United States	H-AWS-1
Google †	Google Australia Pty Ltd (102 417 032), head AU entity, **not confirmed certificate holder**	Alphabet Inc.	United States	H-GOO-1
Oracle	Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Limited (003 074 468)	Oracle Corporation	United States	H-ORA-1
Equinix	Equinix Australia Pty Limited (092 807 264)	Equinix Inc.	United States	H-EQAU-1
Microsoft †	Microsoft Pty Ltd (002 589 460), head AU entity, **not confirmed certificate holder**	Microsoft Corporation	United States	H-MSAU-1
IBM	IBM Australia Ltd (000 024 733)	International Business Machines Corporation	United States	H-IBM-1

Provider	Entity (or head AU entity)	Declared ultimate parent	Jurisdiction	Ref
Digital Realty ‡	Australian Metronode operating company, **exact SPV unpinned**; register-face vehicles are US LLCs (H-DR-ABN-1, H-DR-ABN-7)	Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (Maryland)	United States	H-DR-SEC-1, H-DR-ASIC-1
Fujitsu	Fujitsu Australia Ltd (001 011 427)	Fujitsu Limited	Japan	H-FUJ-1
DCI Data Centers	NineZero DC Management I Pty Ltd (607 631 809)	Brookfield Asset Management Inc	Canada	H-DCI-2

† **Google and Microsoft:** the HCF certifies a product ("Google Australia – Cloud Service offering (Google Cloud Platform)"; "Microsoft Azure Cloud"), not a legal entity, and the certificate-holding company is not confirmed; the entity shown is the head Australian entity. ‡ **Digital Realty:** the register entry is brand-only and the specific Australian Metronode company holding the SYD10/11/14/MEL11 enclaves is not pinned; it is settled foreign on the face of the register because the operating entities are Australian companies [H-DR-ASIC-1] beneath a Maryland parent [H-DR-SEC-1], while the Digital-Realty-named Australian registrations are US LLCs [H-DR-ABN-1, H-DR-ABN-7]. In all three cases the **jurisdiction finding (United States) stands regardless of the entity caveat.**

4.3 Behind fund or trust structures: 2 providers (beneficial_unresolved)

Two providers resolve, on the companies register, to a named Australian top company, above which control sits in a structure the register does not record. Each is treated in full in Section 5; here the token and the structural reason only:

- **Canberra Data Centres**, chain established to CDC Group Holdings Pty Ltd (612 332 073); its members include a foreign company holding the largest beneficial parcel on the ordinary class, a foreign registered custodian company holding the second-largest parcel non-beneficially for a beneficiary the register does not name, an Australian superannuation corporation, and individual shareholders [H-CDC-1, H-CDC-2].
- **DigiCo** (SYD1), chain established to HMC Digital Infrastructure Ltd (682 024 924); above it, a

stapled listed trust, HMC Digital Infrastructure Trust (ARSN 682 160 578) [H-HDI-1, H-DGT-1]. DigiCo's second certification, the BNE2 facility, is **unresolved** at the entity tier (candidate iseek Pty Ltd, 094 230 467, inferred from the prospectus, not confirmed).

4.4 Australian-controlled: 15 providers

Fifteen providers resolve to an Australian terminus by token: 1 `no_owner`, 4 `no_parent`, and 10 `resolved`. **Sliced Tech is not among them**: its ownership was deliberately not resolved (the company is deregistered), so it is not an Australian-control finding; it is the register-flag entry, at 4.5. Tokens per Section 2.

`no_parent` (4), widely-held or listed tops, with owners but no parent entity above them:

Provider	Entity	Ref
AUCloud	AUCyber Limited (622 728 189), ASX: AUC	H-AUC-1
Vault Cloud	Vault Systems Pty Ltd (159 030 127)	H-VAU-1
NEXTDC	NEXTDC Limited (143 582 521), ASX: NXT	H-NXT-1
Telstra	Telstra Group Limited, ASX: TLS	H-TLS-1

For NEXTDC and Telstra the `no_parent` token follows from their standing as widely-held, ASX-listed top companies (ASX: NXT, ASX: TLS), a matter of public record. H-NXT-1 and H-TLS-1 are Australian Business Register records: they anchor the legal entity and its active Australian-public-company status, not the absence of a parent above it. No share-register extract was purchased for either.

`no_owner` (1), no ownership interest exists at all:

Provider	Entity	Basis	Ref
Deloitte	Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (ABN 74 490 121 060)	Australian partnership; international body a UK company limited by guarantee, no shareholders	H-DEL-1, H-DEL-2, H-DEL-3

`resolved`, Australia (10), traced to natural persons or to disclosed listed groups. The eight condition-4 chains (marked **NP-verified**) were opened by primary extract to natural persons; that fact is the basis of Section 6.

Provider	Entity	Terminus	Ref
Emantra	Emantra Pty Ltd (116 306 453)	One natural person at an Australian address (**NP-verified**)	H-EMA-1
GoHosting	GoHosting Pty Ltd (136 903 172)	Two natural persons at Australian addresses (**NP-verified**)	H-GOH-1
Ironstar	Ironstar Hosting Services Pty Ltd (628 724 578)	Five natural persons at Australian addresses, via three member holding companies (**NP-verified**)	H-IRO-1, H-MRH-1, H-JYC-1, H-VSL-1
Centorrino	Centorrino Technologies Pty Ltd (606 931 524)	Two natural persons, one at an Australian address holding 72.3 per cent, one at a United Arab Emirates address holding 27.7 per cent (**NP-verified**)	H-CEN-1, H-CTG-1, H-AMC-1, H-CTH-1
Springfield	Springfield Real Estate Sales Pty Ltd (009 648 220)	Four natural persons at Australian addresses, via two member holding companies (**NP-verified**)	H-SPR-1, H-HEW-1, H-MUR-1
Secure Collaboration	Secure Collaboration Pty Ltd (145 533 580)	Three natural persons at Australian addresses, one via a member holding company (**NP-verified**)	H-SEC-1, H-TMI-1
Cloud Carrier	Cloud Carrier Operations Pty Ltd (668 982 483)	Two natural persons at Australian addresses, via a member holding company (**NP-verified**)	H-CLC-1, H-CCH-1, H-FOR-1
Australian Data Centres	Australian Data Centres - Mitchell Pty Ltd (143 135 997)	Dexus Holdings Pty Limited, disclosed listed group (ASX: DXS)	H-ADC-1

Provider	Entity	Terminus	Ref
Macquarie Technology	Macquarie Technology Operations Pty Limited (082 930 916)	Semark Pty Ltd → Macquarie Technology Group Limited, ASX: MAQ, disclosed listed group	H-MAQ-1
Macquarie Telecom	ACN 082 930 916 (former name of the Macquarie Technology entity)	as above, disclosed listed group	H-MAQ-1, H-MAQ-2

4.5 Sliced Tech: the register-flag entry (not an Australian-control finding)

Sliced Tech is certified as "Sliced Tech Pty Ltd", an Australian proprietary company by incorporation. That company, ACN 165 997 008, is recorded by ASIC as deregistered [H-STK-4], and its ownership was **deliberately not resolved** for that reason (Section 3). It is therefore **not** an Australian-control finding: it is carried in the denominator as a **procedural, register-flag entry**, and no ownership claim is made on a deregistered company. The register-integrity finding is Section 3.

Reconciliation

10 foreign + 2 `beneficial_unresolved` + 15 Australian-control + 1 register-flag = 28 providers. The 15 Australian-control comprise 1 `no_owner`, 4 `no_parent`, and 10 `resolved`; the 1 register-flag is Sliced Tech (Australian by incorporation, ownership unresolved, carried procedurally, not as an ownership finding). Every provider in the Australian-control group carries an archived, hashed H-ref. NEXTDC and Telstra are widely-held, ASX-listed top companies, from which the `no_parent` token follows; H-NXT-1 and H-TLS-1 anchor each entity and its active public-company status on the Australian Business Register, not the ownership finding itself.

Section 5: The two beneficial_unresolved providers

Two of the 28 providers, Canberra Data Centres and DigiCo, carry the token `beneficial_unresolved`. For each, the company register resolves the ownership chain to a named Australian top company, and then stops, because above that company sits a fund, trust, or stapled structure that a register of companies does not record. The framework's own instruments return an Australian-looking answer while the locus of control sits in a layer those instruments cannot see.

5.1 What the token asserts, and what it does not

`beneficial_unresolved` asserts one thing: **jurisdictional uncertainty at a named structural point, on primary sources.** For each of these two providers the assessment can state, from an archived record, exactly which Australian company the chain reaches and exactly what kind of structure sits above it.

It does **not** assert a hidden foreign owner. The assessment did not acquire the records of the fund, trust, or scheme above the top company, and it makes no claim to know who sits behind that layer or where they are. The finding is precisely that **the company register cannot answer the question**: that the beneficial layer is structurally invisible to the instrument the framework relies on. That is the finding at its true width: not a failure to locate an owner, but a positive statement that the owner is not locatable by the register, and that the register is what the framework's checks use.

5.2 DigiCo

DigiCo holds two Strategic-tier certifications, and for its Sydney enclave the token is `beneficial_unresolved`. The finding turns on what stands above the enclave's operating company on the register, and on what the register cannot show above that. HDI SYD1 Pty Limited names a single Australian owner: HMC Digital Infrastructure Ltd (ACN 682 024 924), which it declares as its ultimate holding company [H-HDI-1]. Followed on the companies register alone, DigiCo's chain closes in Australia at that company.

It does not close there. HMC Digital Infrastructure Ltd is stapled: issued as one DigiCo Infrastructure REIT security together with a unit in HMC Digital Infrastructure Trust (ARSN 682 160 578), a managed investment scheme, so that a share and a unit move as one [H-DGT-1]. Because the companies register does not carry trusts, the point at which control is held is invisible to it. The chain is established to HMC Digital Infrastructure Ltd and stops at the staple above it, condition 1. HMC Capital, the manager of the vehicle, is recorded for completeness and is not a link in the chain; management is not ownership.

Two features are specific to this provider. The company that holds DigiCo's SYD1 certificate is not itself confirmed: the certified-provider list carries a brand, not a legal entity, and HDI SYD1 Pty Limited is the operating candidate rather than the named holder. That does not loosen the finding: each candidate sits in the same chain beneath the same staple, so wherever the certificate rests, it rests below the same trust. The finding on DigiCo is therefore exact and bounded: a provider certified at the framework's highest tier whose control, on the primary record, passes into a trust the companies register cannot see.

5.3 Canberra Data Centres

Canberra Data Centres' chain resolves to CDC Group Holdings Pty Ltd (ACN 612 332 073), which declares no ultimate holding company: it is the top company on the register [H-CDC-1, H-CDC-2]. CDC Group Holdings has **23 members** [H-CDC-2]. They comprise the institutional and fund holders and a custodian (the Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation, One Managed Investment Funds Limited, and The Northern Trust Company), the founder (an individual shareholder, with Boorer Enterprises Pty Ltd), JRLAD Super Pty Ltd, the New Zealand investor Infratil No.5 Limited, and **16 individual shareholders (management)**. The seven non-management members are the consortium of seven that Section 2 refers to; with the sixteen management shareholders they make the twenty-three. The chain **stops because** part of that ownership is held through funds and a trust that are not resolvable to a single ultimate controller on the company register, condition 1. The token turns on the fund and trust holders: they are the layer the companies register cannot see through. The individual members are named natural persons on the register and are not what makes the layer above dark.

The 23 members hold across three share classes: 631,693,301 ordinary shares, and two restricted-management classes of 26,129,167 and 38,935,000 shares [H-CDC-2]. On the ordinary class, **Infratil No.5 Limited, a New Zealand company (printed Org No. 609 583 351), beneficially holds 314,084,912 of 631,693,301 shares: 49.7 per cent, the largest single holding, short of a majority.** The Northern Trust Company, itself a foreign registered body (ARBN 126 279 918), holds 218,107,763 shares, 34.5 per cent, non-beneficially as custodian; the beneficiary is not stated on the register. Its printed address line reads " 'Future Fund & Medical Research Future Fund' Level 12, 120 Collins Street, Melbourne VIC 3000"; an address is not an ownership statement, and no inference about the beneficiary is drawn. The Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation holds 76,027,523 shares, 12.0 per cent, non-beneficially. The two restricted-management classes are held by the founder, management shareholders, and One Managed Investment Funds Limited. Class voting weightings are not stated on the extract, so no control percentage can be read off the register.

The consequence, stated plainly: **the largest beneficial holding in a Strategic-tier certified provider is foreign, the second-largest parcel is held by a foreign registered custodian for an unnamed beneficiary, and the register does not permit control to be computed.** That is the `beneficial_unresolved` finding at its actual width. The finding is the presence of foreign capital in the ownership, not foreign control of the provider.

5.4 Why this bears on the framework

At Strategic tier the framework certifies two providers whose control sits in structures (a consortium of funds and a foreign registered custodian company holding for an unnamed beneficiary in one case, a stapled listed trust in the other) that its own register-based checks cannot see through. In both cases the ASIC ultimate-holding-company field returns an Australian company and goes no further, while the layer that would answer the jurisdiction question is one a register of companies is not built to record. This is the same species of gap as the one AOS-CMP-2026-001 identified in the framework's treatment of foreign compellability: a question the instrument is not built to ask. Section 8 sets out that relationship.

Section 6: The Australian findings as control

6.1 The objection

An assessment organised around the proposition that certified providers are more foreign than they appear has an interest in finding foreign control. A reader is entitled to put the strongest version of the concern: that the method was tuned toward the headline, that the fifteen Australian findings are the residue of a search that stopped looking as soon as it could call a provider Australian, and that the ten foreign findings are therefore the product of a process that would have found foreign control wherever it looked. A method that returned only the alarming answer would be worth nothing. The question is whether this one did.

6.2 The answer is in the method's symmetry, not in assurances

The stopping rule (Section 2) is applied identically in both directions: it stops at a foreign entity and at an Australian one by the same test, once the jurisdiction of control is settled. And the depth policy (Section 2) does not let an Australian result off lightly. Where a chain stopped at an Australian holding company rather than at a natural person, the depth policy required it to be recorded as **rule-terminated**, not extract-verified: Australian on the strength of the rule, with the ownership below that company not yet opened. That distinction produced a standing list of eight company chains that read Australian by rule but had not been tested by an extract.

6.3 What was then done to those eight

The eight chains were opened, at the additional cost of purchasing each extract: the buyer of the assessment paying to test, and if possible break, the assessment's own Australian findings. The eight are counted at the holding company that headed each chain: Michael Richardson Holdings, JYC Software, and Vasan Lang (Ironstar); Centorrino Group (Centorrino); Hewbourne and MUR (Springfield); TaylorMade IT (Secure Collaboration); and Cloud Carrier Holdings (Cloud Carrier). Where reaching a natural person required opening a further company inside a chain, A & M Centorrino and CT Holdings 2 under Centorrino Group, and Fortal under Cloud Carrier Holdings, those openings belong to their chain: eight chains, closed by opening eleven companies. They belong to five providers, and every one terminated at a natural person rather than at a company, fund, trust or limited partnership, and every terminus but one carries an Australian address on the register:

- **Ironstar**, its three member holding companies were opened: Michael Richardson Holdings Pty Ltd [H-MRH-1], JYC Software Pty Ltd [H-JYC-1], and Vasan Lang Pty. Ltd. [H-VSL-1], terminating respectively at one, at two, and at two natural persons at Australian addresses. The three held 530, 220, and 250 of 1,000 shares, the full issued capital, so no member was omitted.

- **Centorrino**, Centorrino Group Pty Ltd [H-CTG-1] has two natural-person owners on the record. Its members are A & M Centorrino Pty Ltd (5,420 shares) and CT Holdings 2 Pty Ltd (1,806 shares), both opened [H-AMC-1, H-CTH-1] and both wholly owned by the same natural person, whose address on the register is Australian, and a second natural person, a direct member holding 2,774 shares [H-CTG-1], whose address on the register is in the United Arab Emirates. The three holdings sum to 10,000 of 10,000, the whole company: 7,226 shares, 72.3 per cent, at an Australian address, and 2,774 shares, 27.7 per cent, at a foreign one. The direct member is a member of the Group and is not a member of either sub-holding company; both persons are counted because both are printed on the register. The control finding rests on the Australian-address majority; the foreign-address minority parcel is stated because the register states it, and no inference is drawn from an address beyond what Section 7 records.
- **Springfield**, Hewbourne Pty. Ltd. [H-HEW-1] and MUR Pty Ltd [H-MUR-1] were opened. Hewbourne terminates at two natural persons at Australian addresses, holding 1 and 99 of its 100 issued shares, the full capital. MUR terminates at two natural persons at Australian addresses, holding 1 and 99 of its 100 issued shares, the full capital. A third name appears in the MUR extract's name layer as a former member or officer and holds no current parcel; the two current holders account for the whole company.
- **Secure Collaboration**, TaylorMade IT Pty Ltd [H-TMI-1] was opened, terminating at one natural person at an Australian address, who holds both of its 2 issued shares, the full capital.
- **Cloud Carrier**, Cloud Carrier Holdings Pty Ltd [H-CCH-1] resolved to Fortal Pty Ltd, which was then opened [H-FOR-1], terminating at two natural persons at Australian addresses, holding 2 and 1 of its 3 issued shares, the full capital.

None of the eight flipped to a foreign entity. None reached a fund, trust, or limited partnership. One terminus carries a foreign registered address, disclosed above; no chain terminated in a foreign entity, and the control finding in each case rests on the Australian-address holding. Several of the parcels at these termini are marked on the register as not held beneficially; the holder of legal title is the terminus for the purpose of this finding, and Section 7 records what is and is not established above that. Every one of the eight has a recorded share count, and in every case the recorded members account for the full issued capital, so each natural-person terminus is the complete membership, not a visible subset of a larger one.

The extract purchasing ran only one way because the untested layer sat only one way: rule-termination is the depth policy's category for an Australian result resting on a rule, and no foreign finding rests on a rule — each of the ten foreign chains terminates at its declared ultimate parent, listed and widely held, where an extract would establish nothing the declaration does not. The asymmetry in the purchasing reflects the structure of the chains, not a choice about which findings to test.

6.4 The limit, stated in the same breath

This establishes jurisdiction of control, not full beneficial ownership, and the limit is the one Section 2 records. Stopping at a natural person does not trace what sits behind that person (their other holdings, their own affairs), and the assessment makes no claim that it does. The finding is jurisdictional, and it is symmetric: the rule stopped at a foreign holding company in exactly the way it stopped at a natural person at an Australian address, and neither stop reaches past the point at which jurisdiction is settled. The Australian findings are bounded in precisely the same way as the foreign ones.

6.5 What the control warrants

The value of this is not the claim that these providers are safe; the assessment makes no such claim. It is narrower and it is the load-bearing one: the method that produced the ten foreign findings is the same method that produced the fifteen Australian findings, and it was applied to destruction in both directions: extended, at cost, into the chains it had every reason to want to flip, where it held. That is the warrant for reading the foreign number as a finding rather than as an artefact of the question.

Section 7: Stated limits

The assessment states its own boundaries so that a reader does not have to find them. Six findings are bounded at the entity tier, three at the instrument tier, one coverage limit bounds the register-integrity findings, one non-observability limit bounds any claim about the exercise of the reach the register establishes, and one methodological limit governs all of them.

1. DigiCo: BNE2 certification, entity unresolved. DigiCo holds two certifications; the BNE2 facility is not resolved to a legal entity. The candidate, iseek Pty Ltd (ACN 094 230 467), is inferred from the DigiCo Infrastructure REIT prospectus [H-DGT-1]; it is not confirmed and no extract was acquired. Appears in Section 4.3.

2. DigiCo: SYD1 certificate holder. The SYD1 enclave is resolved to `beneficial_unresolved`, but the specific company holding the certificate is not confirmed: HDI SYD1 Pty Limited (ACN 094 338 333) [H-HDI-1] is the candidate operating company, not the confirmed certificate holder. The structural finding is unaffected, because whichever entity under the same staple holds the certificate reaches the same terminus (Section 5.2). Appears in Sections 4.3 and 5.2. One further register fact bears noting: HDI SYD1 Pty Limited is a company registered on 31 August 2000 whose current name started on 10 February 2025 (Form 205A on the extract) [H-HDI-1]; it carries a former name, the same register dynamic Section 3.2 records, though the current extract does not print what the former name was.

3. Digital Realty: exact certified entity. The jurisdiction is settled foreign (United States) on the face of the register: the operating Metronode companies are Australian [H-DR-ASIC-1] beneath a Maryland parent [H-DR-SEC-1], while the Digital-Realty-named Australian registrations are US LLCs [H-DR-ABN-1, H-DR-ABN-7]. The specific Australian Metronode company holding the SYD10/11/14/MEL11 enclaves is not pinned. Appears in Section 4.2.

4. Sliced Tech: post-deregistration vehicle. Whether the provider's operations continued through the Sliced Tech Holdings Unit Trust (ABN 66 290 396 526) [H-STK-5] after the company's deregistration is not established. The finding concerns the register, that a certified name maps to a deregistered company, and not the company's continuity of operation. Appears in Section 3.

5. Macquarie Telecom: entity identity. That the two register listings, "Macquarie Telecom Pty Ltd" and "Macquarie Technology", resolve to a single legal entity (ACN 082 930 916) is a strong inference from the former-name record [H-MAQ-1, H-MAQ-2], not an established fact; the framework's record of which entity holds which certificate would be required to establish it. Appears in Sections 3.2 and 4.1. The arithmetic consequence, if the inference holds: the twenty-eight providers of Section 4 are twenty-seven distinct legal persons, and the four dual-certification holders become three holding two and one holding three. The counts stated throughout use the register entry as the unit and stand either way.

6. Google and Microsoft: certificate holder. For each, the head Australian entity is confirmed, Google Australia Pty Ltd [H-GOO-1] and Microsoft Pty Ltd [H-MSAU-1], but the framework certifies a product, and the specific entity holding the Google Cloud Platform or Azure certificate is not confirmed. The jurisdiction finding (United States) is settled regardless, because every candidate entity rolls up to the same foreign parent. Appears in Section 4.2.

7. Canberra Data Centres: control percentage not computable. The CDC extract prints the members of each share class and their holdings, but class voting weightings are not stated [H-CDC-2], so no control percentage can be computed from the register. The largest beneficial holding on the ordinary class is foreign at 49.7 per cent; what that holding commands in control terms is not a question the register can answer. Appears in Section 5.3.

8. List names against registered names: coverage. The list-name-versus-registered-name test — an ASIC Organisations & Business Names search of the name exactly as the certified-provider list prints it — was run by register search for four entries. Two of the resulting observations appear as the findings in Section 3. Two further observations arising from the same test were notified to the Certifying Authority on 28 July 2026, with fourteen days allowed, closing 11 August 2026; they are not published in this assessment because that notice period had not closed at the date of publication. They will be recorded in a revision or a subsequent assessment, together with any response received. The test is satisfied by identity for four further entries, whose listed string equals the verified current registered name on the pinned extract (GoHosting Pty Ltd, Ironstar Hosting Services Pty Ltd, Centorrino Technologies Pty Ltd, Springfield Real Estate Sales Pty Ltd). For the remaining twenty entries the listed strings are trade or brand names and the test was not run. Nothing is inferred either way for those twenty.

9. Exercise of the reach: non-observability. This assessment establishes the jurisdiction of control — whom a foreign state could act through — not that any such reach has been exercised. No case is known to this practice, from the public record, in which a United States-incorporated provider was compelled to disclose an Australian institution's data held in Australia. That absence is not evidence of the regime's disuse: under 18 USC 2705, notice to the customer of a disclosure demand's existence may be delayed, by court order or by supervisory certification, in extendable periods of up to ninety days, and a court may order the provider served with the demand not to notify any other person of its existence, for such period as the court deems appropriate [H-LII-1]. While such an order is in force the provider is barred from disclosing that the demand exists, so an exercised demand need not appear in any public record. The assessment therefore makes no claim that such a case has occurred, and no finding in it should be read as an allegation that one has.

10. Terminus nationality: not established by the register. Where a chain terminates at a natural person, the ASIC extract prints that person's name and registered address. It does not print citizenship, residence, or nationality, and none is asserted here. The address is used as the jurisdictional proxy because reachability rather than nationality bears on compellability, and it is a proxy: an address is not a statement of where a person is habitually resident, and a person at an Australian address may be reachable elsewhere, as a person at a foreign address may be reachable here. One terminus in this assessment carries a foreign registered address, disclosed in Sections 4.4 and 6.3. Where extracts print a place of birth, it is disregarded: birth place bears on neither jurisdiction nor reachability. Appears in Sections 2.3, 4.4 and 6.3.

11. Beneficial entitlement at natural-person termini: not established. Where a chain terminates at a natural person, the ASIC extract prints, for each parcel, whether it is held beneficially. Several parcels at termini in this assessment are marked as not beneficially held, meaning the member holds legal title while beneficial entitlement rests elsewhere; the register does not name the beneficiary. The finding recorded here is jurisdiction of control, which rests on the holder of legal title, who exercises the shareholding and is reachable at the address the register prints. Beneficial entitlement above those parcels is not established and is not asserted. This is the same boundary Section 2 draws between jurisdiction of control and full beneficial ownership, stated at the point where the register makes it visible. Appears in Sections 4.4 and 6.3. Section 5.3 treats a non-beneficial holding as decisive because there it sits above a top company at the point where the chain would otherwise continue, so the register's inability to see through it is what stops the chain. At a terminus the chain has already stopped: control is settled at a natural person at a stated address, and beneficial entitlement above that person is a further question this assessment does not reach in either direction. The two treatments follow from where in the chain the flag appears, not from which answer it produces.

The methodological limit that governs all findings. The assessment establishes the **jurisdiction of control, not full beneficial ownership** (Section 2). The chain is traced only as far as the point at which jurisdiction is settled, and it stops there in either direction: at a foreign entity and at a natural person at an Australian address by the same test. Where a chain stops at a natural person, the assessment has not traced what sits behind that person; where it stops at a foreign holding company, it has not traced the capital behind that company. Both are the same deliberate boundary, applied symmetrically, and every finding in the register is bounded by it.

Section 8: Relationship to AOS-CMP-2026-001

This assessment is one half of a finding whose other half is AOS-CMP-2026-001.

What that assessment established. AOS-CMP-2026-001 examined whether the Hosting Certification Framework tests foreign compellability, the capacity of a foreign jurisdiction to compel a provider to act on data it holds. It found that the framework does not reach that question: its foreign-ownership screening treats owners in allied jurisdictions as resolving the concern before compellability is tested, so a provider can be certified at Strategic tier without the compellability question ever being asked. That argument is made in full there and is not re-argued here.

How this assessment completes it. AOS-CMP-2026-001 showed that the question is not asked. This assessment shows the register that resulted from not asking it: of the 28 providers certified at Strategic tier, **10 are under foreign control** and **2 sit behind fund or trust structures the companies register cannot see through**. These are not inferences about what the framework might have missed; they are the certified list, resolved to jurisdiction of control on primary records. The framework's highest sovereignty tier certifies a population on which the compellability question plainly bears: foreign-controlled providers at the point where control, not incorporation, is what a foreign jurisdiction can act through.

The join. A framework that does not ask the compellability question has certified a provider list on which the question plainly bites. AOS-CMP-2026-001 identifies the unasked question; this assessment names the providers to which it applies. Read together, they state that the gap is not hypothetical: it has a certified population, and this is that population.

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